Abstract The reconstruction of a larger polity in a violence-torn society such as Somalia requires negotiation of a new social contract between the superordinate body and the local units of governance that have provided citizens some degree of order throughout the conflict. In this article we show that the very different trajectories for state-building in the north and south of the country result in good part from different attention to this generalisation. The founding leaders in Somaliland and Puntland consulted extensively with the assemblies of elders and were able to create civilian constitutional orders. Military leaders in the south and central regions did not incorporate their elders into their political systems, even though they controlled similar amounts of territory to their counterparts in the north. Ultimately various Islamic movements did build on community-level governance and used it to successfully challenge the old 'warlords' but most of those allied with the Transitional Federal Government remain weak at the community base.
Even though Somalia was composed of stateless societies before colonialism and much of the country has returned to that condition today, it did and does possess local systems of governance that provide social order (Leonard and Samantar 2011) . With the collapse of the national government of Somalia that followed the successful revolution in 1991 against then President Siad Barre, the commercial centres, ports and trading routes from which revenues could easily be extracted fell under the control of militias organised by former army officers and their business allies. Although clan governance had been greatly weakened by Italian colonialism and was not important (at least among elites) in the major urban areas, it began to reappear as a principle of social organisation as Barre's government weakened in the 1980s. As the fighting for territorial control deepened after 1991, all the 'warlords' and businessmen came to base their alliances on sub-clan affiliations. For example, General Mohamed Said Hersi 'Morgan' (who ultimately came to control Kismaayo) initially was allied with other officers of the Ogaden sub-clan even though he was Harti, but ultimately he formed a Harti sub-clan alliance. Similarly, at the community level people reinforced their sub-sub-clan affiliations and relied primarily on their 'diya-paying' groups 1 to assure their protection. Even though the elite level of militia organisation and the communitylevel of mutual protection both were based on segmentary patrilineages, the two did not always have close relationships.
We have argued elsewhere (Leonard and Samantar 2011) that the legitimacy of a post-conflict state in contemporary Africa relies on two social contractsone within the community and another between it and the larger state. Traditionally social contract theorists (from Hobbes through Rawls) have used the idea of an imaginary social contract to argue about when and whether citizens should obey their state, in other words, whether they should accord it legitimacy. In contemporary discussions about Africa, however, the idea of the social contract has also come to include whether or not people actually do feel an obligation to their rulers and what they expect from them in return. The colonial state was based on the legitimacy inhabitants gave to their local systems of governance and then the bargain that was made between that 'traditional' order and the state itself -in other words a dual social contract. Mamdani (1996) has highlighted the importance of this two-tiered system of order in rural Africa. It is our observation that during periods of civil violence a similar dual contract is evident in the urban areas as well, with communities segregating along ethnic lines and choosing leaders (who are not necessarily traditional) to enforce internal order and mediate conflicts with other groups (see Mushi, this IDS Bulletin).
A second aspect of local governance beyond the sub-sub-clan and the diya-paying group is evident as well among the Somalis -the Islamic Sharia court. Somalis are gifted traders and devout Muslims. Throughout the period of their civil wars they have relied heavily on local Sharia courts to resolve their commercial and family disputes. These courts are rooted in the local community and in Somaliland and Puntland they are supported by the state/regional government as well. In the southern and central regions of Somalia, however, the 'warlords' failed to incorporate either the local elders or the Sharia courts into a governance order. This double neglect left them vulnerable to the Islamic Court Union and its successors when they developed in the early twenty-first century. The different strategies and trajectories of Somaliland and Puntland, on the one hand, and the 'warlords' of the south and centre of the country, on the other, is the story to which we now turn. (For a full development of the arguments in this section and the evidence supporting them, see Leonard and Samantar 2011) .
The transitions in Somaliland and Puntland
Somaliland and Puntland followed similar routes from being 'liberated' territories to the reconstruction of state structures and their stories have been well told elsewhere (Bradbury 2008; Mohamed and Nur 2008) . Both regions were early in giving birth to exiled, clan-based movements in opposition to the Barre government and these parties quickly assumed local leadership after its fall in 1991. But the important point in terms of their ultimate stability and legitimacy is that in both cases the new systems of governance were validated and shaped through extensive, locally led processes of consultation with citizen assemblies of elders and their representatives (isimo).
Somaliland was proclaimed very quickly as an independent entity by an assembly of elders meeting at Burco on 18 May 1991. The consolidation of its governance structures took another two years of wide consultation, however. This led in 1993 to the formal appointment of sub-clan representatives to a national legislature and the selection as president of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who had been a prime minister of Somalia in the 1960s and initially had opposed Somaliland's return to separate independence. The new constitution of Somaliland provided for a two-house legislature. The 'upper', consultative, house is comprised of the founding leaders and representatives (isimo) of the elders. The 'lower', dominant, house was initially comprised of representatives selected by sub-clan assemblies of elders (who in the case of the Somalis are all adult males) but is now chosen by election.
The movement that established itself in power in Puntland had long been led by Abdulaahi Yusuf Ahmed, who had served in the Somali army before going into exile. After militarily expelling an Islamist extremist group in 1992, he became the dominant figure in the region. The incorporation of elders into the support base for his regime came later than in Somaliland, although it similarly involved extensive consultations. Puntland declared itself an autonomous region within the (non-functional) state of Somalia in 1998 and its Council of Elders, as the unicameral legislature, confirmed Ahmed as its president. There was fighting when Ahmed had his term as president extended in 2001, but the Council of Elders (which is still selected from the base by local assemblies of elders, rather than elected) remains a key part of Puntland's governance structure.
The foregoing sketches miss an important qualification, however, one that speaks still further to the importance of local governance. The administrative regions of Sanaag and Sool lie at the boundary of Somaliland and Puntland and are contested between them. They were parts of British Somaliland and on that basis are claimed by present-day Somaliland. Clan-wise, however, they are Darood and thus more naturally a part of Puntland, which also claims them. The residents of the regions have appointed different sets of senior elders who separately are accepted as representatives by each of the two proto-states (Hoehne 2011) . These appointments of isimo are politicised and influenced by the governments of Puntland and Somaliland, but their centrality illustrates both the dependence of local The traditional structures in South Central Somalia are different and more composite, fragmented, weakened and confused than in the north, for a range of reasons:… [a] heterogeneous mix of… people… the colonial experience is different… the dynamics of the civil war in the south differed as well, resulting in an equally different impact on the traditional structures. Hence, the common attempts to superimpose, or project the welldescribed northern traditional structures upon the societies in the south are wrong.
We submit that this statement is partly correct while also missing a critical aspect of the sad political trajectory in the south. It certainly is true that the capital, Mogadishu (located in South Central Somalia), 2 was such a valuable commercial prize and had such a diverse clan demography that there was little prospect that it could have been handled through the northern pattern of relatively consensual consultations of clan isimo and gatherings of elders. But even the southern port of Kismaayo is no more ethnically homogeneous or commercially valuable than the Somaliland port of Berbera and the Puntland port of Boosaaso. It is true that the inter-riverine area around Baidoa incorporates intertwined clans involved in distinct livestock and crop production systems (with the latter much more easily disrupted by armed predation). But these clans had previously evolved complex and mutually beneficial systems of interdependent production. The ability of the otherwise very fragile Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia to survive in Baidoa until late 2006 suggests that viable inter-ethnic and inter-clan understandings were not impossible there. Thus these demographic and economic factors do not seem to us to have been absolutely determinative. We believe that other aspects of the political history of the south and centre are also important in explaining its instability and failure to build effective legitimacy from below. The military and business leaders there were so intent on displacing one another and on extracting the commercial and revenue benefits that would come from expansion that they neglected to consolidate their legitimacy at the base until it was too late. There is variation between the regions in the degree of involvement of political leaders in their peace initiatives. In Shabeele Hoose (Lower) and Hiraan there was none and instead all the peace efforts in the first were led by religious leaders and in the second by the symbolic traditional heads of lineages (isimo).
On the other extreme, in Jubba Hoose, where control of the port of Kismaayo was at stake, there were 19 initiatives in the early and late periods of conflict and claimants to regional authority were involved in 58 per cent. Similarly 92 per cent of the peace processes in Gedo involved the regional leadership. It probably is no coincidence that Gedo is the region out of which the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) was able to launch the takeover of the two Jubba regions (and Kismaayo) in 2001. The JVA then engaged in a spurt of 13 local peace initiatives in these two regions after 2005, but by this time the UIC had already gained considerable strength in the area.
Puntland is similar to the south in having grown out of the initiative of a warlord who had business support, but in its case assemblies of elders also were involved intensively and extensively in regional governance and it twice even supported the peace initiatives of elders on its southern periphery. Both in Somaliland and Puntland these consultations seem to have given the new structures of authority a legitimacy and durability that were lacking in the centre and south.
Of course ultimately political Islam came to be the dominant contestant for control in the centre and south. It has shown the legitimacy and durability that the officer-business alliances lacked. 
Conclusions
The economics, demographics and conflicts in the south and centre of Somalia all were such as to make the involvement of elders and other local structures in shaping and legitimating regional governance more difficult. Elders, sub-clan leaders and religious leaders were not missing, however. They were engaged in numerous initiatives to resolve and bring peace to local disputes.
Occasionally the international community or regional warlords and politicians supported these local initiatives, but usually they were preoccupied with reconstituting a national government and who would dominate it. They focused on fighting, negotiating with and co-opting the militia leaders and businessmen who put themselves in contest for national office, and for the international resources that could be expected to flow through a government of Somalia once it was properly constituted.
The consequence was that possibilities for consolidating regional governments and legitimating them with their populations were neglected. After the UN retreated from its early effort to build decentralised regional governments up into a national federation, communities were left to govern themselves.
This gap in local governance was taken up not only by sub-clan and other traditional structures but increasingly by Sharia courts as well. By the time the warlords contesting for national power realised that their real opponents were not one another but the proponents of political Islam the opportunities to build a counter from below were lost in most of the country.
It may be that sub-clan elders and lineage leaders will be able to join with more moderate Islamists to defeat the radical versions of political Islam in much, and maybe all, of Somalia. The moral of the experience of the Somalis is clear, however. In a conflict country, the social contract that exists between citizens and their local governance structures not only does not disappear but becomes much more critical to the security of those at the bottom. A primary part of post-conflict reconstruction must be rebuilding the social contract between community governance structures and national ones. In some circumstances local governance may need to be reformed; not everything that is 'traditional' enjoys the support of its constituents. But citizens will rebuild and revalidate the state only from the bottom-up. 
